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EDITOR'S NOTE
INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME II
MARGINS SYMPOSIUM 2002
The number of women incarcerated in America continues to
rise. This presents a growing need to recognize that the incarceration
of women raises many difficult issues differently than the
incarceration of men.' On March 14, 2002, MARGINS sponsored a
symposium entitled Experiences of Women Inmates in the Twenty-
First Century: How Well Does the System Serve Female Offenders and
Their Families.2 This event corresponded to the broadcast of the radio
documentary, "Forgotten Voices," co-produced by MARGINS and the
University of Maryland, Baltimore County's Music Department.
"Forgotten Voices" includes interviews with women detained at the
Baltimore City Detention Center. The inmates and staff tell their
stories and discuss the availability and effectiveness of rehabilitative
services both in BCDC and in their communities. "Forgotten Voices"
gives a valuable and intimate depiction of one facility's treatment of
its female inmates. 3  Articles developed from the symposium will
examine issues raised by the growing incarceration of women
including, but by no means limited to, the following.
WOMEN' S CRIMINALITY
In order to evaluate the efficacy of the modem corrections
system in dealing with women inmates, it is important to understand
its clientele. First, how and why do women come under the authority
of the criminal justice system? Who are these female offenders, what
crimes do they typically commit, and most importantly, why? Many
have pointed to the nation's "War on Drugs" as a cause of the
1. See Barbara Bloom & Stephanie Covington , Gender-Specific Programming for
Female Offenders: What is it and Why is it Important? (paper presented at the 50th Annual
Meeting of the American Society of Criminology, Washington, D.C., November 11, 1998),
available at http://www.nicic.org/pubs/1998/015127.pdf.
2. See MARGINS, Symposium 2002, at
http://www.law.umaryland.edu/margins/Symposium2002.asp.
3. The documentary can be heard on the Internet using the free RealPlayer program.
The audio file is archived on MARGINS' website at
http://www.law.umaryland.edu/margins/graphics/ForgottenVoices.rm.
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increasing incarceration rates of women.4 In contrast from men, most
female drug convictions are for offenses related to drug use rather than
drug trafficking. A study of California inmates found 71.9% of
women were convicted on drug or property charges compared with
only 49.7% of men.5
Various theories on female criminality abound.6 Like their
male counterparts explanations for female crime often focus on
socioeconomic conditions. Some theories are more gender specific.
Feminist theories have developed two schools of thought on female
criminality. 7 Liberation feminists believe that as women move toward
equality with men, escaping traditional gender roles, it is inevitable
that women also move toward comparable offending rates.
8
Oppression feminists disagree, stating that women commit crimes as a
backlash against patriarchal oppression. 9  Liberation feminists see
offenders as agents, while oppression feminists see offenders as
victims. How well do these and other theories explain the causes of
female criminal behavior? How should these theories impact legal
policy decisions?
4. Bloom & Covington, supra note 1, at 2. See MEDA CHESNEY-LIND, THE FEMALE
OFFENDER 147 (1997); Paula C. Johnson, At the Intersection of Injustice: Experiences of
African American Women in Crime and Sentencing, 4 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 1 (1995);
Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Feminist Challenge in Criminal Law, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 2151
(1995); Myrna S. Raeder, Creating Correctional Alternatives For Nonviolent Women
Offenders and Their Children, 44 ST. Louis L. J. 377 (2000); Kathleen Daly & Michael
Tonry, Gender, Race, and Sentencing, 22 CRIME & JUST. 201 (1997); Christopher M.
Alexander, Crushing Equality: Gender Equal Sentencing in America, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER &
L. 199 (1997).
5. See Bloom & Covington, supra note 1, at 2 (citing BARBARA BLOOM ET AL., WOMEN
IN CALIFORNIA PRISONS: HIDDEN VICTIMS OF THE WAR ON DRUGS (Center on Juvenile and
Criminal Justice 1994)).
6. See Dana M. Britton, Feminism in Criminology: Engendering the Outlaw, 571
ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 57 (September,
2000); Cheryl Hanna, Ganging Up on Girls. Young Women and Their Emerging Violence, 41
ARIZ. L. REV. 93 (1999).
7. See Hanna, supra note 1, at 106.
8. See id. at 107 (citing FREDA ADLER, SISTERS IN CRIME: THE RISE OF THE NEW
FEMALE CRIMINAL 95 (1975)).
9., Id. (citing Meda Chesney-Lind, Girls, Gangs, & Violence: Anatomy of Backlash, 17




Second, partially because of the relatively small number of
female offenders compared to men, advocates for women inmates
continue the struggle to ensure that women receive programs and
services afforded to male prisoners.10 With respect to vocational
training programs, female inmates often do not have access to the
same quality of services as men. Frequently the programs are limited
to activities conforming to traditional gender roles such as
cosmetology, sewing, typing, and homemaking, rather than programs
that could train women to be economically independent upon release."
In addition, researchers have found that gender-specific
programs may be necessary to ensure that the incarceration experience
is not more harsh than that experienced by the similarly sentenced
male offender. Bloom and Covington outlined the principles of
effective gender-specific programs:
0 Equality does not mean sameness; in other words,
equality of service delivery is not simply about
allowing women access to services traditionally
reserved for men-equality must be defined in terms of
providing opportunities which are relevant to each
gender. Thus, treatment services may appear very
different depending on to whom the service is being
delivered;
0 Gender-specific programs are not simply "female
only" programs that were designed for males;
10. See Rebecca Jurado, The Essence of Her Womanhood: Defining the Privacy Rights
of Women Prisoners and the Employment Rights of Women Guards, 7 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC.
POL'Y & L. 1, 3 (1999) (citing, e.g., Casey v. Lewis, 834 F. Supp. 1477, 1551 (D. Ariz. 1993)
(stating that male prisoners in mental health facilities were offered more substantive training
and education programs than their female counterparts); McCoy v. Nevada Dep't of Prisons,
776 F. Supp. 521, 524 (D. Nev. 1991) (stating that male prisoners had access to a wider
variety of educational and recreational programs than female prisoners); Canterino v. Wilson,
546 F. Supp. 174, 211-12 (W.D. Ky. 1982), vacated in part, 869 F.2d 948 (6th Cir. 1989)
(discussing disparities in the quality of vocational school courses in men's and women's
prisons, including the exclusion of women prisoners from certain sectors of "on the job"
training programs and work release programs); Glover v. Johnson, 478 F. Supp. 1075, 1086
(E.D. Mich. 1979) (stating that female prisoners had access to training in five broad
occupational areas while male counterparts had access to 20 different vocational programs)).
11. Id. at 13. See generally Donna L. Laddy, Can Women Prisoners be Carpenters? A
Proposed Analysis for Equal Protection Claims of Gender Discrimination in Educational and
Vocational Programming at Women's Prisons, 5 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REv. 1 (1995).
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* Females' sense of self is manifested and develops
differently in female specific groups as opposed to coed
groups;
0 The unique needs and issues (e.g.,
physical/sexual/emotional victimization, trauma,
physical and mental health, pregnancy and parenting) of
women and girls should be addressed in a safe, trusting
and supportive women-focused environment;
9 Whenever possible, women should be treated in the
least restrictive programming environment available.
The level of security should depend on both treatment
needs and concern for public safety;
o Treatment and services should build on women's
strengths/competencies and promote independence and
self-reliance; and
* Cultural awareness and sensitivity should be
promoted and the cultural resources and strengths in
various communities should be utilized.'
2
Enduring problems in female incarceration also include
prisoner abuse, privacy issues, providing adequate physical and mental
health care, and the availability and efficacy of substance abuse
treatment for women.
IMPACT ON CHILDREN OF INMATE MOTHERS
Third, academics and policymakers have paid little attention to
the impact of female incarceration on the families left behind.
13
Research shows that 70% of female prisoners in state and federal
prisons are single parents compared to 18% of their male
counterparts. 14  Incarceration often puts the parental rights of these
12. Bloom & Covington, supra note 1, at 9-10.
13. "[Rlelatively little is actually known about the causal role that the penal sanctioning
of parents plays in children's lives, alone or in combination with other experiences and events
in the lives of these children." John Hagan & Ronit Dinovitzer, Collateral Consequences of
Imprisonment for Children, Communities, and Prisoners, 26 CRIME & JUST. 121, 144 (1999)
(citing Stewart Gabel, Behavioral Problems in Some of Incarcerated or Otherwise Absent
Fathers: The Issue of Separation, 31 FAMILY PROCESS 303, 303-14. (1992)).
14. See Jessica Y. Kim, Note, In-Prison Day Care: A Correctional Alternative for
Women Offenders, 7 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 221, 225 (2001) (citing Elise Zealand,
Protecting the Ties that Bind from Behind Bars: A Call for Equal Opportunities for
Incarcerated Fathers and Their Children to Maintain the Parent-Child Relationship, 31
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parents at risk. Today, twenty-nine states have explicit statutory
provisions that include parental incarceration as one of the criteria in
supporting termination of parental rights or adoption. 15 Incarcerated
women are almost five times more likely to lose their children to foster
care than are male inmates.
16
The incarceration of mothers also punishes their children. The
Women's Prison Association recently reported that the children of
incarcerated mothers
have a greater tendency to exhibit many of the
problems that generally accompany parental absence
including: low self-esteem, impaired achievement
motivation and poor peer relations. In addition, these
children contend with feelings like anxiety, shame,
sadness, grief, social isolation and guilt. The children
will often withdraw and regress developmentally,
exhibiting behaviors of younger children, like
bedwetting . ... As the children reach adolescence,
they may begin to act out in anti-social ways.
Searching for attention, pre-teens and teens are at high
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 247, 247-249 (1998); TRACY L. SNELL, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
WOMEN IN PRISON: SURVEY OF STATE PRISON INMATES 2, tbl. 1 (1994)).
15. Dr. Lanette P. Dalley, Imprisoned Mothers and Their Children: Their Often
Conflicting Legal Rights, 22 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 1, 17 (2000)(citing ALA. CODE §26-
18-7(a)(4) (1992 & Supp. 1998); ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.080(o) (Lexis through 1998 Sess.);
ARz REV. STAT. §8-533(B)(4) (West 1999); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §366.26(c)(1) (West
1998 & Supp. 1999); COLO. REV. STAT. §19-3-604(1)(b)(III) (1998); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13,
§1 103(a)(5)(a)(3) (Supp. 1998); FLA. STAT. ANN. §39.806(1)(d) (West Supp. 1999); GA. CODE
ANN. §15-11-8 1(b)(4)(B)(iii) (1994 & Supp. 1998); IDAHO CODE §16-1602(t)(2) (Supp. 1998);
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/1-1(D)(r), (s) (West Supp. 1999); IOWA CODE ANN.
§232.116(1)(i)(2), 232.116(2)(a) (West Supp. 1999); KAN. STAT. ANN. §38-1583(b)(5) (Supp.
1998); LA. STAT. ANN. CHILDREN'S CODE, art. 1194 (West 1999 Supp.); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 210, §3 (c)(xiii) (West 1999); MISS. CODE ANN. §93-15-103(3)(f) (Supp. 1998); Mo.
ANN. STAT. §211.447(6)(6) (West Supp. 1999); MONT. CODE ANN. §41-3-609(2)(e), 41-3-
609(4)(b) (1997); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §170-C:5(VI) (Supp. 1998); N.J. STAT. ANN, §9:3-
46(a) (West 1999 Supp.); N.M. STAT. ANN. §32A-4-2(C)(4), §32A-4-28(B)(2) (Michie 1998
Supp.); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW §384-b(7)(e)(ii)-(f) (McKinney Supp. 1999); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. §2151.41.4(E)(12), (13) (Anderson 1998 Supp.); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §7006-
1.1(12) (West 1999); OR. REV. STAT. §109.322 (1989 & Supp. 1998); R.I. GEN. LAWS §15-7-
7(a)(2)(i) (1998 Supp.); TENN. CODE ANN. §36-1-102(1)(A)(iv) (1998 Supp.); TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. §161.001(1)(Q) (West 1999 Supp.); WIS. STAT. ANN. §48.13(8) (West 1998
Supp.); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §14-2-309(a)(iv) (Michie 1997)).
16. See Alexander, supra note 4, at 219 (citing TRACY L. SNELL, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
WOMEN IN PRISON 6 (1994)).
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risk for delinquency, drug addiction and gang
involvement.'
17
Should additional services be created to serve the children of
incarcerated mothers? Should the judicial determination of what is an
appropriate sentence ever take into account the extraordinarily punitive
impact a custody sentence will have on the offender's family?' 8 The
recent trends in sentencing guidelines leave judges minimal discretion
for treating family responsibilities as a mitigating circumstance that
would lead to probation as an alternative to prison. This has created
disparately harsh results for incarcerated mothers and their children. 19
LEGAL REMEDIES TO GENDER INEQUALITY
IN THE CORRECTIONS SYSTEM
Lastly, where salient inequalities are found between men and
women inmates, how effective are the available legal remedies? The
lack of some prison programs and services has been challenged as
constitutionally inadequate relying on the Eighth Amendment and
Equal Protection Clause.2 °  However, constitutional challenges
brought on behalf of female prisoners often have not been effective in
securing programs and services specifically relevant to female
prisoners.21  The challenges failed because the requested program is
not compelled by a constitutional right; the lack of the program does
not amount to cruel and unusual punishment, or the program's focus
on the unique needs of women negates the equal protection argument
because with respect to program the male and female prisoners are no
longer similarly situated.22
17. John Hagan & Ronit Dinovitzer, Collateral Consequences of Imprisonment for
Children, Communities, and Prisoners, 26 CRIME & JUST. 121, 145 (1999)(quoting WOMEN'S
PRISON ASSOCIATION, BREAKING THE CYCLE OF DESPAIR: CHILDREN OF INCARCERATED
MOTHERS 9 (1995)).
18. See, e.g., Karen R. Smith, United States v. Johnson: The Second Circuit Overcomes
the Sentencing Guidelines' Myopic View of "Not Ordinarily Relevant" Family
Responsibilities of the Criminal Offender, 59 BROOKLYN L. REV. 573 (1993).
19. See generally Alexander, supra note 4.
20. See Jurado, supra note 10, at 16-19.
21. See id. at 18. (citing KATHERINE GABEL, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF CORRECTIONS, U.
S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE LEGAL ISSUES OF FEMALE INMATES (1983); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452
U.S. 337, 348 (1981); Women Prisoners of D.C. Dep't of Corrections v. District of Columbia,
93 F.3d 910, 923, 918-32 (1996); Berrios-Berrios v. Thornburgh, 716 F. Supp. 987, 990-91
(E.D. Ky. 1989); Klinger v. Department of Corrections, 31 F.3d 727, 731-32 (8th Cir. 1994)).
22. See id. at 17-19.
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How have challenges to the inadequacy of gender-neutral
programs provided to women fared since the Supreme Court's most
recent and relevant application of the heightened scrutiny standard for
gender discrimination in United States v. Virginia?23 How does that
decision meld with the holding of Turner v. Safley, that the proper
inquiry for prisoners' claims of constitutional violations is "whether a
prison regulation that burdens fundamental rights is reasonably related
to legitimate penological objectives, or whether it represents an
exaggerated response to those concerns"?
24
In forthcoming editions of MARGINS in Volume 2, some of
the participants at the 2002 Symposium will address these and other
related issues. The diverse panelists represented a wide range of
professions related to the incarceration of women. Hopefully, this
multidisciplinary discussion can enhance the knowledge of those who
shape corrections law and policy as they deal with the continuing
increase in the number of incarcerated women.
The published discussion begins in this issue with an article by
Dr. Kenneth Kerle and a reprint of a recent study from the Chicago
Coalition for the Homeless. Dr. Kenneth Kerle is currently the
Managing Editor of American Jails Magazine and a leading expert on
jail policy and management. In his article, he describes the treatment
women receive in America's jails.
Additionally, in this issue we are fortunate to present a study
conducted by the Chicago Coalition for the Homeless in October 2001.
The study was conducted as a survey of women detained at the Cook
County Jail in Chicago, Illinois. The author presents the findings and
makes several recommendations for changes in corrections policy
concerning women.
23. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
24. 482 U.S. 78, 87 (1987). See Rosemary M. Kennedy, The Treatment of Women
Prisoners After the VMI Decision: Application of a New "Heightened Scrutiny," 6 AM. U. J.
GENDER & LAW 65 (1997); Laddy, supra note 11; Jennifer Arnett Lee, Note, Women
Prisoners, Penological Interests, and Gender Stereotyping: An Application of Equal
Protection Norms to Female Inmates, 32 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REv. 251 (2000); Angie
Baker, Note, Leapfrogging Over Equal Protection Analysis: The Eighth Circuit Sanctions
Separate and Unequal Prison Facilities for Males and Females in Klinger v. Dep't of
Corrections, 76 NEB. L. REv. 371 (1997).
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COMING IN MARCH 2003 ...
EXPANDING THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS' RIGHT TO
COUNSEL TO INDIGENTS IN CIVIL CASES: THE CIVIL GIDEON
MOVEMENT:
MARGINS' SYMPOSIUM 2003
In March 2003, MARGINS will hold a symposium on the
possibility of securing a right to counsel for indigent persons in civil
cases. In 1963, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Sixth
Amendment guarantees indigents in non-capital criminal cases the
right to court-appointed counsel.25 The petitioner, Clarence Gideon,
was the first poor, uneducated individual to receive free legal aid in a
non-capital criminal case. Before Gideon, only defendants in death
penalty cases had the right to receive government-funded counsel.26
However, it was at least a decade before all the states followed suit.
Today, the method for providing indigent defendants with counsel in
criminal cases has evolved into the public defense system. This
service is available at both the federal and state levels, and has made
significant progress in the last thirty years.
However, indigents in civil cases still lack the right to
government-funded counsel. This lack of access to legal
representation causes many additional problems for individuals
already suffering in poverty. For example, indigents without counsel
are frequently unable to enforce their property rights. Eighty percent
of the 30,000 New Yorkers, who are evicted each year, lack
representation to challenge their displacement from their homes.2 7
Indigent consumers lacking professional legal assistance are unable to
effectively use the intimidating U.C.C. or common law contract
principles to effectively enforce their rights against wealthy
businesses.
The stakes are very high for indigent litigants. Indigent
parents, having no right to counsel in custody disputes, lose the ability
to fight for their right to see and/or raise their children. Indigent
litigants lose causes of action and defenses because of their lack of
25. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
26. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
27. See Christy Harlan, New York Bar Says Volunteer Lawyers Can't Make Dent in
Eviction Problem, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 1998.
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education and legal knowledge, especially when trying to meet statutes
of limitations, and other court-imposed obligations.
According to California Justice Earl Johnson, "[w]hen it comes
to the legal entitlement to free counsel for indigent civil litigants, the
United States is in a distinct minority among the industrial
democracies of the world. 29 In Maryland, "about 80 percent of low-
income residents, who need a lawyer in civil disputes, can't get one."
30
The Civil Gideon movement asks: does a legal right really exist if you
lack the means or ability to enforce it?
However, indigent civil litigants are not completely without
access to counsel. There is a federally funded organization called the
Legal Services Corporation (LSC), which is also established in many
states. The LSC was created in 1974 "to provide legal representation
for poor people in civil matters.",31 This entity still exists today, but as
the facts and statistics show, it is unable to meet the extensive demand.
According to a recent study by the American Bar Association, "forty
percent of low income households surveyed had civil legal problems in
the last twelve months, but could not obtain counsel. 32
Opponents who question the necessity of a Civil Gideon point
out that due process considerations at trial effectively ensure the
indigent civil litigants receive a just outcome. While indigent civil
litigants do not have a constitutional right to counsel, appointment of
counsel at the trial court's discretion remains an option. However, the
burden of proving that due process demands an indigent litigant be
provided counsel is high. The Court, in Lassiter v. Dept. of Social
Services, held: "the Court's precedents speak with one voice about
what "fundamental fairness" has meant when the Court has considered
the right to appointed counsel, and we thus draw from them the
presumption that an indigent litigant has a right to appointed counsel
only when, if he loses, he may be deprived of his physical liberty.33 It
is against this presumption that all the other elements in the due
process decision must be measured., 34 The standard for overcoming
this presumption is "whether the three Eldridge factors [the private
28. See Joan Grace Ritchey, Limits on Justice: the United States' Failure to Recognize a
Right to Counsel in civil Litigation, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 317, 337 (2001).
29. See Earl Johnson, Jr., The Right to Counsel in Civil Cases: An International
Perspective, 19 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 341, 345 (1985).
30. See Joe Surkiewwicz, THE DAILY RECORD (Baltimore), Nov. 2, 2000, at 1C.
31. See Francis T. Murphy, Now is the Time to Revitalize Legal Services, 209 N.Y.L.J.
83 (1993).
32. Ritchey, supra, note 14, at 329.
33. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
34. Id. at 26-27.
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interests at stake, the government's interest, and the risk that the
procedures used will lead to erroneous decisions], when weighed
against the presumption that there is no right to appointed counsel [in
civil cases], suffice to rebut that presumption and thus to lead to the
conclusion that the Due Process Clause requires the appointment of
counsel. 35 Those who argue against extending the right to counsel in
civil cases explain that this balancing process sufficiently enables
indigents to adequately enforce their rights in civil suits.
Others point out that establishing a Federal right to counsel in
civil cases is not necessary because many states have already
implemented similar rights through their state constitutions. The Court
itself in Lassiter noted "33 States and the District of Columbia provide
statutorily for the appointment of counsel in termination [of parental
rights] cases." 36  Therefore, if states continue to create rights to
counsel in civil cases, even short of an absolute right in all causes of
action, it really is not necessary for recognition of a "Civil Gideon"
via the Federal Constitution.
Noting the Supreme Court's refusal to recognize a right to
counsel in civil cases, advocates have suggested new alternatives to
ensure that legal assistance can be provided to a larger proportion of
indigents. One suggestion is the creation of a mandatory pro bono
service. 37  There is debate, however, surrounding what sort of
provisions should be made mandatory. Who, if anyone, should be
exempt from mandatory service? For example, judges, government
attorneys, legal services lawyers, and public defenders, have all been
mentioned as being exempt due to their existing status as public
servants.
38
Other questions are who would qualify as an indigent, or who
would benefit from the pro bono services? Maryland has adopted the
same definition of indigent in its public defense statute as the federal
public defense statute. 39 Both the federal statute and the Maryland
statute define an indigent as one who is unable to pay for adequate
legal representation. In addition, both statutes state that income is not
dispositive, and that ability to afford counsel, after basic living
expenses are paid, is the ultimate inquiry. Yet another hotly debated
35. Id. at 3 1(citing Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)).
36. Id. at 34.
37. See Esther F. Lardent, Mandatory Pro Bono in Civil Cases: The Wrong Answer to
the Right Question, 49 MD. L. REv. 78 (1990); Talbot D'Alemberte, Tributaries of Justice:
The Search for Full Access, 73 FLA. B.J. 12 (1999)).
38. See Lardent, supra note 23, at 81; D'Alemberte, supra note 23, at 20.
39. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (2002); Md. Ann. Code art. 27A (2002).
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issue is who will pay for the services, or how to raise revenue to fund
those services.
A final issue is should a mandatory pro bono service be
established, how "mandatory" would the service be? There needs to
be a mechanism or mechanism or means to enforce the requirement.
A problem could be posed when trying to enforce this requirement on
non-practicing attorneys, or attorneys who are barred in several states.
Another alternative to a "Civil Gideon" is to expand the
existing LSC, or pass state statutes requiring government-funded
administrative agencies that provide services to the poor to pay for
legal fees, if the agency was found to have denied the indigent an
entitled benefit. 40 However, because the Court has refused to extend
the right to appointed counsel to civil indigent litigants, it is unlikely
Congress will approve more funding for the LSC.4 1 In addition, the
latter solution does not address the needs of individuals who sue
corporations or private individuals.
There are many issues surrounding the debate over whether a
"Civil Gideon" is not only feasible, but constitutionally required. In
March 2003, MARGINS will be holding a symposium to discuss these
and related issues. Continue to check our website for further details
including a "Call for Papers., 42 Articles from the 2003 symposium
will be published in Volume III of MARGINS.
BRIAN P. MARRON*
40. See D'Alemberte, supra note 23, at 14, 19.
41. See John McKay, Federally Funded Legal Services: A New Vision of Equal Justice
Under Law, 68 TENN. L. REV. 101, 102 (2000).
42. The URL of the MARGINS website is http://www.law.umaryland.edu/margins.
* Editor-in-Chief of MARGINS: Maryland's Law Journal on Race, Religion, Gender,
and Class. J.D. Candidate, University of Maryland School of Law 2002; B.A., Criminology
and Criminal Justice, Government and Politics, University of Maryland, College Park, 1998.
Melissa Nimit and Tim Sutton contributed to the Civil Gideon section. I would like to thank
Professor Barbara Bezdek and the members of MARGINS for all of their hard work during the
2001-2002 academic year as MARGINS firmly established its place among the law journals at
the University of Maryland School of Law: Tanisha Bailey, Christina Bylsma, Michael Cerri,
Albert Churilla, Alexa Eggleston, Donna Engle, Amy Eroh, Kinda France, Brigitte Gardenier,
Tonisha Gilliard, Sarah Hilton, Lana Jeng, Andrea Jolliffe, Nicole Lomartire, Melissa Nimit,
Linda Martin Pybas, Lori Romer, David Russell, Christopher Ryon, Laura Skowronski,
Heather Spurrier, Mark Sullivan, Tim Sutton, Eden Terenzini, Toby Treem, and Kimberly
Wolf.
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